Cloud Based Secure and Privacy Enhanced Authentication & Authorization Protocol  by Khalid, Umer et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  22 ( 2013 )  680 – 688 
1877-0509 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of KES International
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.09.149 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
17th International Conference in Knowledge Based and Intelligent Information and
Engineering Systems - KES2013
Cloud based Secure and Privacy Enhanced Authentication &
Authorization Protocol
Umer Khalida, Abdul Ghafoor, Misbah Irum, Muhammad Awais Shibli
aNational University of Sciences & Technology, H-12, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
Abstract
Cloud computing is an emerging computing model which facilitates organizations and the IT industry. It helps them to multiply
or lessen their resources according to their operational requirements. However, the organizations are reluctant to store their
sensitive information on the cloud due to various privacy and identity tracking threats. In the past few years, a lot of research
and development eﬀorts have been made to deﬁne centralized and federated security mechanisms for the protection of identity
information in a cloud environment. However, to the best of our knowledge none of the systems have been designed keeping
anonymity as the key component. This paper describes an authentication and authorization protocol which outlines the main
features of anonymous communication in the cloud. The solution is an extension of existing standards making it easy to
integrate and compatible with existing standards.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a general purpose technology that greatly impacts economy in terms of energy, cost and
eﬃciency. It has emerged from distributed computing, evolved incrementally from conceptual grid computing and
has been shaped by various other concepts. Organizations such as e-governments, e-learning, hospitals and health
care are beneﬁting from this technology by downsizing ICT setup costs, incorporating multilateral network eﬀects
and increasing performance and storage. Moreover, cloud is based on diﬀerent service models which include
the pay-per-service and the pay-per-use service models. These enable organizations to provide low cost ﬂexible
growth [1].
Keeping aside the beneﬁts of this technology, organizations now face signiﬁcant security challenges such as
privacy, data leakage and identity protection while migrating applications and sensitive information to and from
the cloud [2]. Out of these challenges anonymous communication still needs signiﬁcant attention and addressing.
There are reasons as to why and where anonymity is required. It has been seen in the past that many of the well
known cloud service providers have been vulnerable to various kinds of threats including identity theft and data
leakage, as discussed in [3] [4] [5].
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Sensitive information stored on the cloud can be replicated and then used for data mining purposes. These
key security challenges in cloud need immediate attention from both academia and the industry. A well known
fact is that the organizations providing cloud services, such as storage, sell user/customer data for diﬀerent pur-
poses claiming that they anonymize it before doing so. This claim has been proven wrong in past. Most of this
information can be linked with the identity information to leak considerable amount of sensitive data about any
organization or individual and cause lack of trust [3] [5].
Diﬀerent solutions have been proposed to tackle the issues related to identity theft and linkage in cloud out
of which the choice of anonymization of identity information is most preferred. Anonymization of identity in-
formation provides protection against identity theft and diﬀerent types of linking attacks. However, the problems
associated with the authentication and authorization of anonymized identity information still remains at hand and
needs to be further addressed.
One possible solution that has been developed to cater to these problems is anonymous IDMSes. However,
with every organization having diﬀerent security requirements, a cloud service consumer or the provider opting
for such an IDMS is often left unclear about the tradeoﬀs associated with these systems and how these tradeoﬀs
can aﬀect their security requirements [6]. Therefore, after extensively reviewing literature on anonymous authen-
tication and how it works in cloud we have proposed an anonymous authentication and authorization protocol
independent of any IDMS.
This paper is arranged in the following order: Section 2 brieﬂy discusses some open standards related to au-
thentication and authorization along with anonymous authentication protocol with the proposed protocol presented
in Section 3. Section 4 describes an attack model and the eﬀectiveness of using anonymous identities against such
attacks. Conclusion and future line of work is presented in Section 5.
2. Background
Authentication and authorization have been a part of every secure communication system. They have evolved
rapidly in order to automate processes and eliminate costs and complexities. Anonymous entity authentication and
authorization for cloud are broad and captivating terms often causing misconceptions about the type of services
they oﬀer thus requiring further investigation. Diﬀerent solutions including protocols and identity management
systems have existed oﬀering privacy and anonymity some of which have been categorized and discussed. The
ﬁrst step in achieving privacy and anonymity would require trust development as well as eﬃcient management
of user identities and user keys. Keeping this in mind we have taken into account some studies related to trust
development and key management. We have divided our literature review into two tracks including the modern
authentication and authorization protocols such as OAuth, OpenID and Shibboleth along with the traditional
anonymous authentication/authorization and trust development mechanisms.
2.1. Existing Solutions
Anonymous authentication generally seems to be a contradictory statement in itself as the task of authentica-
tion is proving ones identity while anonymity is to hide ones identity. A number of protocols for anonymous au-
thentication have been proposed based on group, ring signature [7] and public key encryption schemes. Amongst
these protocols, the public key based encryption for anonymity enjoys lesser attention.
[8] Suggests construction of an anonymous authentication protocol which is veriﬁably anonymous. The server
encrypts the same challenge along with diﬀerent random numbers and sends them to the user; the user performs
decryption and sends the challenge back to the server. The server upon receiving the value of the challenge from
the client compares it to the originally sent value of the challenge and then sends back all the random numbers used
to encrypt the challenge. If anyone of the random numbers mismatch the authentication process is unsuccessful.
Such a study is conducted in [9] where the main concept behind authentication is creation of an anonymity
set for all the users and then proving their identity by sending N challenges encrypted under N diﬀerent public
keys rather than just a single challenge R. The authors propose veriﬁable and revocable anonymity allowing this
scheme the beneﬁt of ad-hoc features.
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Public Key Infrastructure lacks many features when analyzed with respect to the required features in trust
management. In [10] the authors analyzed the trust model of PKI along with others to highlight the diﬀerent
shortcomings of these models and proposed a number of features that should be present in an open network.
Trust development and management are major issues related to security in current cloud platforms, therefore
analysis of the diﬀerent trust models in large and distributed environments need to be carried out. Such a study
is performed by the authors of [11] after which they propose a novel trust model dividing the resource nodes into
domains and sets trust agents thus achieving both identity and behavior authentication on which trust relationship
can be built.
Hierarchical cross certiﬁcation works well for organizations which want their root certiﬁcation to have control
over their subordinate CAs. In case of any other setup such as organizations which require certain amount of
cross organizational communication ﬂexibility, peer to peer and bridged certiﬁcation model is more suited. Such
organizations often require development and revocation of trust relationships with the changing policy. An analysis
of inter-domain scenarios is done in [12] where the authors show a lab implementation of a scenario where diﬀerent
organizations each having their own CA want to communicate with each other and show that the bridged and peer
to peer setup indeed work better.
Health care systems are often linked throughout various entities in order to exchange medical data related to
the patients. As of now most of the health information exchange systems provide a uniﬁed method of commu-
nicating the patient data to diﬀerent stakeholders such as the patients, the practitioners and the researchers. It is
therefore diﬃcult to design a system which provides security and privacy to the sensitive patient data such that
information under question still remains interoperable. The authors of [13] bring forth such a framework for ex-
changing medical information which implements the l-diversity algorithm ensuring that the sensitive medical data
is properly anonymized before publicly handed out.
With the above mentioned solutions almost every protocol achieves anonymity using real identity information
as the basis for authentication. What makes our work diﬀerent from existing solutions is that we have proposed
a solution which employs identities generated using anonymous certiﬁcates [14] and then allocates anonymous
identities to the registered users giving our proposed protocol an added layer of anonymity.
2.2. Industrial Solutions
In addition to reviewing the traditional authentication and authorization protocols for achieving anonymity
we have also reviewed some open industrial standards for managing centralized and federated identities in cloud
environment. Some of these standards are listed below:
2.2.1. OpenID
OpenID is an open standard for user authentication without requiring separate ad hoc systems and helping in
consolidation of user identities. It eliminates the need for maintenance of diﬀerent identities by authentication
of the users with diﬀerent relying parties using a third party service. OpenID provides a framework for com-
munication between the identity provider and the relying party. The user may create OpenID accounts with the
identity provider of their choice and then use this identity to authenticate to any service which accepts OpenID
authentication. OpenID neither relies on a central authority nor does it mandate a speciﬁc mean to authenticate
users.Thus, mechanisms as simple as passwords to novel techniques such as smart cards or biometrics can be used
for the sake of authentication. OpenID essentially consists of three main entities, an entity wanting to authenticate
which is the user, a relying party which wants to verify the user identity and an identity provider which provides
the OpenID URLs or XRIs. The authentication takes place with the exchange of the user OpenID identiﬁer which
is the XRI or the URL chosen by the user from the web browser [15].
2.2.2. Shibboleth
Similar to OpenID, Shibboleth is the institution centric approach to manage single sign on (SSO) allowing
users to authenticate to diﬀerent services using just one piece of information. It eliminates the need for require-
ment of diﬀerent identities and passwords to diﬀerent services running under federation of diﬀerent institutes or
organizations by signing in users with just one identity and password. Shibboleth is an open source implemen-
tation of federated identity based management where the identity providers provide information and the service
providers consume this information giving access to content or services [16].
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2.2.3. OAuth
OAuth is an open standard for delegating authorization. It provides a solution for clients of any organization to
access resources of other clients within or outside the organization. OAuth also provides authorization to any third
party to access services and resources of users without sharing any credentials such as passwords or usernames. It
is a framework rather than a protocol, so it is interoperable with any newer version of itself [17].
A growing number of social networking websites are now using OAuth for authorization of various applica-
tions. Once the permissions are granted the application is able to download the complete stream of social data
against the user which is then kept for data mining purposes. By permitting such authorizations OAuth allows
the application provider to use it as a tool to facilitate social networking attacks on the users without his or her
realization.
3. Construction of an Anonymous Authentication & Authorization Protocol in a Cloud Environment
After a comprehensive review of existing protocols and open industrial standards we designed an architecture
consisting of the components essential for providing anonymity as a service in cloud environment. The detailed
architecture and its underlying components have been described as follows:
3.1. Designed Architecture
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the protocol needed to achieve authentication and authorization while pre-
serving user anonymity. Like any other traditional solution this architecture contains a strong authentication server,
an XACML based policy server for authorization and an IDMS with a key server. However, these components
have been used in a novel manner which protects the identity information and has been elaborated in Section 3.
3.1.1. Components
Figure 1 illustrates the main architecture of the protocol described in Section 3, whereas, the components of
the architecture at hand have been discussed further in detail below.
3.1.2. IDMS {Identity Management System}
The identity management server is responsible for storing all the identity information. It is also responsible
for registration of the new users and the distribution of the identity information to all the users. The identity
management system consists of the identity store and the key generation and distribution centre. The identity
store is responsible for storing all the identities while the key generation and distribution centre is responsible for
the generation and distribution of all the user keys.
3.1.3. SA Server {Strong Authentication Server}
The authentication server is responsible for authentication of the users. It receives the requests and makes a de-
cision which validates the users as authenticated or unauthenticated. This authentication server is based on strong
authentication protocol [18] and veriﬁes the user certiﬁcate with the local certiﬁcate authority for authentication
purposes.
3.1.4. LCA {Local Certiﬁcate Authority}
The local certiﬁcate authority generates and veriﬁes anonymous certiﬁcates for the entities wishing to gain
access to a certain service. This certiﬁcate authority may or may not be veriﬁable by some other certiﬁcate
authority in the chain of trust and is dependent on the deployment model. It should be kept in mind that even
though the certiﬁcate authority is able to verify the user identity based on the certiﬁcate, this identity itself is just
a pseudonym and not the real identity of the user. The number of anonymous certiﬁcate issuing authorities/sub
authorities may be further increased or decreased depending on the level of privacy needed.
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Fig. 1. Proposed Architecture
3.1.5. Authorization Server
The authorization server is responsible for receiving and validating the user access request to some particular
service. It maintains a list of all the policies related to the users in the policy engine and updates them when
required. If a request is successfully validated, the authorization server issues an access token to the user granting
him/her access for a particular amount of time.
3.1.6. Web Application
A web application available to the user through the web browser is responsible for all the interactions of the
user with any of above mentioned servers. This web application passes on the requests received from the user
to the servers as well as the responses from the server back to the user. In short this web application acts as on
demand software granting access to any service.
3.2. Protocol
Before we start deﬁning the anonymous authentication and authorization protocol there are four things that
must be considered as pre-requisite.
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• Every Client is already registered to the IDMS and the necessary identity attributes are stored in the ID Store.
• All the system components are present on some cloud infrastructure and the client interacts with the web
application through the web browser.
• The authentication and the authorization server share a pre-shared master key in order to check the authenticity
of the transmitted and the received tokens.
• The described architecture and the solution are given as a cloud service.
3.2.1. Authentication Phase
The Client A begins by selecting a Client B with which it wants to communicate and so builds an authentication
request for the SA server. Since Client A cannot directly access Client B without authenticating itself to the SA
server ﬁrst, this request also contains the Client A anonymous certiﬁcate.
The SA Server receives the authentication request, veriﬁes the certiﬁcate with the local certiﬁcate authority
and the IDMS. This is done by sending the ID to theIDMS which maintains the list of identities in its database.
The SA server also sends the certiﬁcate to the LCA for the veriﬁcation of its validity.
If both of the veriﬁcation requests result in success the SA server calculates a challenge for the Client A
which in our case is a random number. The SA server also attaches an identiﬁer called the Token ID which is a
Session Identiﬁer. The server also stores the generated session and random numbers for future use. If one or both
the veriﬁcation requests either times out or results in a null, the SA server terminates.
Client A on receiving the message stores Session Number and calculates another random number. Client
A concatenates the newly generated random number with the received random number, the token id and signs
the whole with his/her private key i.e.{RNDA‖RNDB‖Token ID}PrA. It then transmits this message back to SA
Server. Client A also includes all three values in the unsigned part of the message. The message format looks like:
RNDA‖RNDB‖Tok ID {RNDA‖RNDB‖Tok ID}PrA.
On receiving this message SA Server uses the Client A Public Key to decrypt the signed part of the message
and compares it to the unsigned part as well as the retained value of the random number it sent. If the result
is a match then the user gets authenticated. Having authenticated the Client A, the SA Server generates an ID
request. This is a request for assigning a new ID for the client which will be used as theAnonymous ID in the
future communication.
The IDMS generates a new identity, maps the information against the real identity in the identity store and
sends back the anonymous identity {AID} to the SA Server. SA Server sends a request to the authorization server
to update the policy against Client A with the AID. SA Server now requests the KDS or key server for key creation
against the new identity; this key will be used in future while exchanging the group keys with the authorization
server. KDS generates a new symmetric key for Client A and sends it back to the authorization server.
Now possessing an anonymous identity and the user key, the SA Server now creates an authentication token
for the user, concatenates it with the received ID and key and encrypts the whole message with the user’s public
key to safely transmit it to the Client A. The format of the authentication token is: Access Token = {AID, RND,
Time Stamp/ Expiry Time} EM . EM= Symmetric Key shared between the SA server and the authorization server.
3.2.2. Authorization Phase
Client A sends the identities of both the communicating parties i.e. Client As anonymous identity and Client
B’s real identity along with the access token received from the authentication server to the authorization server.
The authorization server after receiving encrypted access token and identities stores the IDs and decrypts en-
crypted access token with the symmetric key to get RND and ID. This proves that the access token was indeed
meant for Client A. It is to be noted that the token is encrypted using the pre-shared symmetric key shared between
the authentication and the authorization server.
The Authorization Server checks for policies against both the anonymous IDs in its policy engine. It makes a
decision based on these policies using the policy combiner algorithm which results in {permit, deny or undeﬁned}.
If the result is permit the authorization server sends a key generation request to the KDS.
KDS upon receiving the key generation request selects some random users from the groups of 1 and 2 and
forms a key ring. This key ring is then further used to generate group key for both 1 and 2. A copy of the
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group key is then stored in a ﬁeld of particular ID in the IDMS database while another copy is transmitted to the
authorization server. Authorization server receives the group key and calculates the service token using the master
key {this is the shared master key between the user and the KDS} as follows: Service Token = [GK1] EUK1. It is
to be noted that the key UK1 is the user symmetric key generated at the end of authentication phase.
The authorization server transmits EUK1 {GK1} to the Client A. Client A decrypts EUK1 {GK1} using hi/her
user key {UK1} obtained at the time of authentication and gets GK1. Once it has been authenticated the autho-
rization server similarly transmits the group key GK1 to Client B signed with its user key UK2. Both Client A
and Client B now start transmitting and receiving data securely. A ﬂow diagram representing the above described
protocol is shown in Fig 2.
Fig. 2. Protocol Flow Diagram
4. Evaluation
Authors of [19] have analyzed and broadly categorized identity theft related attacks into ﬁve categories in
application/web applications after a survey. For our protocol we have taken into account all ﬁve categories in
addition to some others and formulated an attack model to see how these attacks are launched and how our
proposed solution for anonymity works against such attacks. These attack types and details are listed in the Table
1.
As future line of work, we plan to extend our protocol by deploying it in a scenario such as health care
systems where privacy of the patient data plays a vital role and evaluate its performance using real data sets from
such systems. Finally, we plan on implementation, benchmark and a formal security analysis of this protocol.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we designed an anonymous authentication and authorization protocol using anonymous public
key certiﬁcates along with standard Strong Authentication and XACML servers. The proposed protocol promises
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Table 1. Threat Model for Identity related attacks in Web Applications
Attack Types Launch Scenario Defensive Measure
Whitewashing Adversary issues multiple anonymous identities based on
one or more than one anonymous certiﬁcates.
Issuing limit for identities, typically one anonymous
identity per certiﬁcate and backtracking anonymous cer-
tiﬁcate for similar purpose.
SQL Injection Adversary uses input validation vulnerabilities to send
corrupt commands back to the database.
The use of No-SQL databases such as MongoDB along
with input white listing.
Phishing Adversary sets up a fake URL similar to the URL of the
real web application convincing the user to enter a valid
certiﬁcate.
The use of anonymous certiﬁcates protects the user iden-
tity to be revealed even if the adversary gets hold of a
certiﬁcate.
Cross-Site Scripting An adversary inserts a malicious script to a dynamic form
presented by the user.
Input sanitization is the answer to this attack, ensuring
that the website only returns the input after validating it
and ﬁlter meta characters while doing so.
Cookie Tampering Adversary modiﬁes the cookie values sent back to the
user web browser.
Use of session identiﬁers and sequence number instead
of transmitting cookies with user credentials.
Session Hijacking Attacker makes use of the improper implementation ses-
sion ID number and assumes user identity.
Using anonymous identities after initial authentication
and encrypting traﬃc using symmetric key prevents such
sort of attacks.
Remote Web Server
Takeover
Attacker makes use of unknown vulnerabilities such as
buﬀer overﬂow to execute Trojans assuming complete
control of the web server.
Prevention of such attacks is only possible by using an
IPS with behavior anomaly detection.
full anonymity and prevents identity theft by employing anonymous identities. We have kept our framework
ﬂexible enough to provide multiple levels of anonymity by using more than just one CA for issuing anonymous
certiﬁcates. The protocol has been designed such that the real identity is never used in actual communication
and whole process is transparent to the user. Our proposed protocol can be integrated with existing identity
management systems and provide anonymity as a cloud service.
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